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GARNISHMENT OF ALIMONY
In a day of such widespread and extensive alimony decrees, it is
abnormal that there* are not more authorities upon the questions
raised by an attempt on the part of the wife's creditors to garnish
future alimony installments. The law is indeed meagre on this
subject and such cases as are available seem to be in hopeless con-
flict. Upon analysis, however, it may be that some guiding prin-
ciples underlie the apparently paradoxical decisions. Two possible
situations, in general, may be presented. First, after a decree for
future installments, creditors of the wife may seek to attach the
same by garnishment and thus subject the payments to the satis-
faction of their claims, whether the installments be payable di-
rectly from the husband to the wife, or payable to a trustee, to be
paid over to the wife at regular intervals; second, the court issu-
ing the alimony decree, either originally or by supplementary de-
cree, may attempt to prevent assignment or garnishment by a pro-
vision against alienation until the money is actually paid over to
the wife. These two situations, with the legal problems involved,
will be discussed separately.
I.
The general question whether or not alimony is subject to gar-
nishment proceedings will depend in part upon the garnishment
statute. Where, as in most states, including Iowa, the statute
provides that "property of the defendant in the possession of
another, or debts due the defendant may be garnished," alimony
decrees for future installments must be brought within the mean-
ing of either "property" or "debts". 1 *
As to whether alimony may be regarded as a "debt," the atti-
tudes of the courts are interesting, if diversified. In some juris-
dictions an action for debt will lie to enforce arrears in alimony on
the ground that the alimony decree created a valid and existing
1 Iowa Code 1924, c. 510, §12101. But see Malone v. Moore, 215 N. W. 625
(Iowa, 1927).
While the recent decision in Malone v. Moore, supra, has started a course of
decision in this state which seems to run counter to certain conclusions of this
article, it is presented here as a timely study of certain features of an inter-
esting subject.-Editor.
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debt.2 In other jurisdictions, however, this has been denied.3 It
has been uniformly denied that alimony is such a debt as to be
provable in bankruptcy,4 but this may merely reiterate that all
debts are not provable in bankruptcy; it is not of much help in
determining whether or not alimony is, properly speaking, a debt.
Some courts, taking the position that alimony is not to be regarded
as a debt, rest the contention upon the ground that, from its very
purpose and nature, it represents an equitable distribution of the
property of the husband, in which the wife had an interest, and
that it was awarded as her apportionment thereof.5
On the other hand, courts have frequently spoken of a decree
for alimony as creating a valid and subsisting debt.6 Thus it rep-
resents such a "debt of record" in the wife's favor as to enable
her to impeach a conveyance by the husband in fraudlof creditors.7
It is said that alimony is such a vested right, after a valid decree,
that conveyances by the husband in fraud of creditors might be
attacked and set aside by the wife in the same manner and to the
same extent as by any other creditor.8 In Thayer v. Thayer, where
the plaintiff's wife sought to have the alimony decree put in such
form that execution could issue thereon under the New York stat-
ute, the court said that "there is no doubt that this amount is due
to plaintiff, and that it is in the nature of a judgment debt, for
2 Lancaster v. Lancaster, 29 Ill. App. 510 (1888); Stratton v. Stratton, 77
Me. 373 (1885); Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R. I. 27, 57 Atl. 1058 (1904).
s Allen v. Allen, 100 Mass. 373 (1868). Contra, Howard v. Howard, ,15
Mass. 196 (1818).
4Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 25 Sup. Ct. 172 (1904); Welty v. Welty,
195 Ill. 335, 63 N. E. 161 (1902), Lemert v. Lemert, 72 Ohio St. 364, 74 N.
E. 194 (1905). Contra, as to decree not subject to modification, Arrington v.
Arrington, 131 X. C. 143, 42 S. E. 554 (1902).
5 See Schooley v. Sehooley, dissenting opinion of Salinger, J., 184 Iowa 835,
169 N. W. 56 (1917).
6 Conrad v. Everieh, 50 Ohio St. 476, 35 N. E. 58 (1893); Picket v. Gar-
rison, 76 Iowa 347, 41 N. W. 38 (1888); Walker v. Walker, 127 Iowa 77,
102 . W. 435 (1905); Chase v. Chase, 105 Mass. 385 (1870); Thayer v.
Thayer, 145 App. Div. 268, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1035 (1911); Schooley v.
Schooley, supra n. 5; Keyser v. Keyser, 193 Iowa 16, 186 N. W. 438 (1922) ;
Burroughs v. Purple, 107 Mass. 428 (1871); Preston v. Williams, 81 Il1. 176
(1876); Linton v. Linton, 54 L. J. Q. B. 529, 15 Q. B. D. 239 (1885).
7 Chase v. Chase, supra n. 6.
8 Walker v. Walker, supra n. 6.
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it is a sum which the court has directed defendant to pay." 9 The
court thereupon declared that an order to docket the decree "did
not amount to a new judgment against him (defendant)."
One decision favoring the view that alimony at least for some
purposes is to be considered a debt, comes from the Iowa court.'0
Under a statute exempting a head of a family from garnishment
for "debt," it was held that "debt" included a judgment for ali-
mony, and that the defendant, who had subsequently married
again, was entitled to such exemption. It required a legislative
enactment to avoid the result of this decision." There seems to be
required some very careful distinction to enable the Iowa court to
demonstrate that alimony does not constitute a debt within the
meaning of the garnishment statute, when it has been declared to
be such within the exemption statute. By the Vse of the term
"debt" in the two statutes, the Iowa legislature may well have
intended in the garnishment enactment the very thing which the
supreme court declared that it meant in the exemption statute,
since subsequent amendment has been confined to the latter.
The court in the Schooley Case, quoting with approval from
Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 1 2 where the wife attempted to enforce a
judgment for alimony against the husband's homestead, said:
" 'The judgment is but a debt, and the plaintiff is not entitled
to precedence, or greater rights than would be the holder of any
other judgment.' "8
Again, the court in the same case declared:
"One against whom a judgment for the payment of money is
rendered is universally known and spoken of as a 'judgment debt-
or,' and the claim against him is recognized as a 'judgment debt.'
It is, to use the language of the cases already cited, a 'debt of
record,' or, as called by some, a 'judicial debt of record.' It is a
debt-a binding obligation to pay a stated sum of money, fixed by
judicial determination." 14
In England upon the authority of Hewitson v. Sherwinr5 where-
in it was held that an order of a court of chancery for the payment
0 145 App. Div. 268, 269, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1035, 1036 (1911).
lo Schooley v. Schooley, supra n. 5.
11 Iowa Code 1924, §11764.
12 52 Iowa 715, 2 N. W. 1000 (1880).
l3 Supra n. 5 at 839, 169 N. W. at 57.
14 Ibid. at 840, 169 N. W. at 58.
l L. R. 10 Eq. 53 (1870).
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of money constituted a debt, it has been held that payments in
arrears of alimony were enforceable against the husband under
the Debtors Act of 1869,1e although the court was not content to
call such an obligation a "debt". 17 American courts, in some
jurisdictions, have adopted a similar position.18
Perhaps the best instances of treatment of alimony decrees as
debts, are to be found in the cases which hold a decree for alimony
within the protection of the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Federal Constitution.1 9 In Sistare v. Sigtare, White, C. J., de-
clared:
"Where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable
in future installments the right to such installments becomes abso-
lute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by
the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the de-
cree has been made prior to the maturity of the installments; sinee,
as declared in the Barber case 'alimony decreed to a wife in a
divorce of separation from bed and board is as much a debt of
record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other judgment
for money is.' "20
It has also been made clear that the fact that a decree for ali-
mony is subject to modification and alteration from time to time,
does not deprive it of-the quality and characteristics of a debt of
record which will be enforced in the courts of another state.2 1 It
is a final judgment nevertheless. So universally established is this
principle in the conflict of laws that in the absence of a full faith
and credit clause, it has been held that an English decree for ali-
3 Linton v. Linton, supra n. 6.
17 Sqe 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (1891), §837, citing Linton v. Linton
to substantiate a Etatement in the text that alimony "is not a debt.."
18 Of. Daniels v. Lindley, 44 Iowa 567 (1876).
19 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U. S. 1858) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S.
1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682 (1910); De Rousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N. W.
896 (1917); Schuler v. Schuler, 209 Ill. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (1904); Rogers v.
Rogers, 46 Ind..App. 506, 89 N. E. 901 (1909); Lape v. Miller, 203 Ky. 742,
263 S. W. 22 (1924); Patton v. Patton, 67 Mise .404, 123 N. Y. Supp. 329
(N. Y. 1910); Tehsman v. Tehsman, 93 N. J. Eq. 76, 114 AtL 320 (1920);
Van Horn v. Van Horn, 196 App. Div. 472, 188 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1921).
20 218 U. S. 1, 16,_ 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 686 (1910).
21 Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N. W. 542 (1922); Werner v.
Pelletier, 148 App. Div. 137, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (N. Y. 1911) ; Trowbridge
v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (1900).
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mony will be enforced in Ireland where the wife sued there for
payments in arrears. 22
It is thus seen that the mere fact that the alimony decree is sub-
ject to modification is not sufficient to deprive it of the attributes
of a debt within the theory of the conflict of laws. The further
objection might be raised that, at any rate, until future install-
ments have matured, there is no valid and subsisting debt to be
garnished. If this objection be not answered by the cases cited
above, it might be argued that it is disposed of under the type of
statute which provides that a "debt not yet due" may be gar-
nished.2 3 If, as the Supreme Court of the United States-has de-
clared, a judgment for alimony is, until recalled, "as much a debt
of record as any other judgment for money," and "debts not yet'
due" are subject to garnishment, there is apparently no reason
why future installments for alimony could not be held subject to
garnishment.
It is not necessary, under such a statute, that a debt be payable
or that the amount even be ascertained at the time of garnish-
ment.24 In the Ottumwa Bank Case, it was pointed out that the
most that could be conceded to defendants and garnishees under
such circumstances, was a continuance until the amount of the
indebtedness was ascertained, which would not be necessary in
garnishing alimony. In the Rankin Case, it was not even certain
that any sum would be due and owing. The interest of the prin-
cipal defendant, though contingent, was nevertheless subject to
garnishment.
Apparently there is some ground for regarding a decree for ali-
mony as creating a "debt," so that it can be brought within the
provisions of the garnishment statute. But it is submitted that
there is not, or should not be, any magic in the word "debt".
Garnishment might well be allowed or denied on other considera-
tions than the mere fastening of the term "debt" upon the obli-
gation owed by the husband to the wife after an alimony decree.
The conception represented by the expression "debt" is a variable
one, and it, like all legal ideas, is subject to evolution, either re-
22 Nunn v. Nunn, 8 L. R. Ir. 298 (1880).
23 See Iowa Code 1924, c. 510, §12086. But see Malone v. Moore, supra
n. 1.
24 Rankin v. Smith, 174 Iowa 537, 156 N. W. 756 (1916); Ottumwa Nat.
Bank v. Norfolk, 185 Iowa 1334, 172 N. W. 3 (1919).
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strictive or expansive. A "debt" in the Roman law certainly had
a wider meaning than we attribute to it today. It applied to a
varied class of obligations in all of which the obligee was called
the debtor or debitor.2 5 Courts should look at the situation and
relationships actually created rather than at the name applied to
the same.26
A decree for alimony creates a valid claim in favor of one person
against another, enforceable in the courts, not only of the state
where ordered, but also of sister states and foreign countries as
well. It can be satisfied out of the property of the judgment
obligee or it may be enforced by contempt proceedings. If a word
descriptive of this situation be needed, what better word can be
employed than the word "debt"? But whether called, technically,
a debt or not, there is reason to hold that it should be subject to
all the processes which the law provides for creditors to reach such
rights as are advantageous to the principal debtor.
To further indicate the nature of the rights created by a decree
for alimony, and the possibilities of subjecting them to garnish-
ment, it must be remembered that there is never any doubt as to
the garnishment of a money judgment by a court of law.2 7 Es-
pecially is this free from doubt where, as in Iowa, statutory pro-
visions specifically include judgment debts.28 It has been held
that judgment debts-of one state cannot be garnished in another,2 9
and that judgment debts rendered in one county cannot be gar-
nished in another county of the same state. 0 The latter qualifi:
cation, however, does not represent the prevalent holdings on this
point, and most certainly is not true in Idwa.31
If money judgments of courts of law are generally subject to
garnishment, the same might well follow as to money decrees of
courts of equity. At one time it was contended that the chancel-
lor's decree could act only in personam, that it could not have the
25 See Sohm, Institutes (3d ed., 1907) 358.
26Roscoe Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 CoL L. Rev. 605.
27 Ochiltree v. Missouri, I. & N. Ry. Co., 49 Iowa 150 (1878).
28 Iowa Code 1924, c. 513, §12158.
29 Wabash R. R. v. Tourville, 179 U. S. 322, 21 Sup. Ct. 113 (1900).
so MeNish v. Burch, 49 S. D. 215, 207 N. W. 85 (1926) ; Scott v. Rohman,
43 Neb. 618, 62 N. W. 46 (1895).
31 Elson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. B. Co., 154 Iowa 96, 134 N. W. 547 (1912).
See also Etumgaxdner v. Halverstadt, 115 Ran. 124, 222 Pac. 762 (1924).
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same effect as the judgment of a court of law, that it could create
no strict "legal" rights, and that it therefore could not create a
"debt of record." 3 2. To deny, however, that this notion has long
been abandoned is to forget the growth of the powers and effects
of decrees of courts of equity for a hundred years. The doctrine
of res adjudlicata applies as fully to chancery decrees as to judg-
ments at law,88 and "legal rights" are created as validly by courts
of equity as by any other tribunal. It was early decided that an
equity decree for the payment of money could not be made the
ground for a cause of action at law,8 4 but the principle was soon
abandoned and a decree of a colonial court of equity was held to
be grounds for a recovery in an action at law in England.85 - Pro-
fessor Cook has pointed out that since Post v. Neafle,8s which
was a similar holding in America, the line of authorities perimit-
ting an action at law on a foreign decree for the payment of
money has been unbroken.8 7  Numerous other instances could be
given where decrees of equity courts are accorded the same effect
as judgments at law.88 It would seem to follow, then, that decrees
of courts of equity for the payment of money might well be held
subject to garnishment, and this view has-some support.8 9 An
alimony decree being a money decree of a court of equity, at least
the door of logic is open to admit of a similar result.
But if alimony is not within the statutory provisions subjecting
"debts" to garnishment, apparently there may be reason to sub-
ject it to garnishment as property "in the possession of another."
The rights that accrue to a wife by virtue of a decree for alimony
8 2 See Lael, Summaxy of Equity Pleading (2d ed.) 35, ni. 4.
a8 PeAnington v. Gibson, 16 How.- 65 (U. S. 1858). See Blaxk, Judgmenta
(2d ed.) 517; see also 2 FTeemac, Sudgments (5th ed.) 1354
s Carpenter v. Thornton, 3 B. & Ald. 52 (1819).
8 Henley v. Soper, 8 B. & C. 16 (1828).
88 3 Caines 22 (N. Y. 1805).
87 See Walter Wheeler Cool" "Powers of Courts.of Equity," 15 0o. L. Rev.
228, 241. See also Wesley N. ffotield, "The Relations Between EquitY and
Law," 11 Mich. L. Rev. 587, 568.
as Thrall v. Waller, 13 'Vt. 231 (1841); Howard v. Howard, supra n. 3; De
Rousse v. Williams, supra n. 19; O'Hagan v. O'Hagan, 4 Iowa 509 (1857);
Patton v. Patton, 67 Misc. 404, 123 N. Y. Supp. 829 (N. Y. 1910). See alo
Cook, op. cit, at 242-2438.
so Pifthian v. New York & E. R. Coy 81 Pa.. St. 114 (1857).
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have been generally defined and regarded as "property rights." 40
The wife has an interest created and protected by the law in the
property of the husband. She is further entitled to support from
him. The decree for alimony is but a recognition of that interest,
or perhaps b6 substitution of one kind of property interest for
another.4 1
One of the strongest reasons urged by Salinger, J., dissenting in
Schooley v. Schooley,42 that alimony was not a "debt," was be-
cause it should be regarded as a sequestration and division of the
property, made on a consideration of the circumstances of the
family, citing Dadels v. Morris43 in confirmation of his views.
Permanent alimony has been said to be a portion of the husband's
estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, and alimony periodic-
ally paid may be regarded as'a portion of his current income or
earnings.44 The court being authorized to decree to the wife so
much of the estate of the husband as it thinks just, or, as in Iowa,
as it deems "right," 45 it may decree such money sum in lieu there-
of as it deems proper, and make the same payable at once or in
installments. It is but an assignment of property, under this view.
It is vested by the court and appropriated to the wife, and is
equivalent to a decree of specific performance. 46
A decree for installments for life has been held such property
interest that it is enforceable against the husband's estate after his
death, 47 and it has been said that such a decree "has the same force
and validity as any other judgment, and may be collected in the
40 Van Ness v. Ransom, 215 N. Y. 557, 109 N. E. 593 (1915); Livingston V.
Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903).; Barber v. Barber, supra n.
19.
4' Livingston v. Livingston, supra n. 40; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 59 Mim.
347, 61 N. W. 334 (1894).
42 Supra n. 5.
43 54 Iowa 369, 6 N. W. 532 (1880).
44 Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 Sup. Ct. 735 (1901).
48 Co(de 1924, §10481.
46 Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 185 (1851); State v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64
N. E. 567 (1902).
47 0 'Hagan v. 0 'Hagan, supra n. 38; Martin v. Thison's Estate, 153 Mich.
516, 116 N. W. 1013 (1908); Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R. I. 303, 92 Atl. 625
(1914); Mellroy v. Mealroy, 208 Mass. 458, 94 N. E. 696 (1911); In re Still-
well, [1916] 1 Ch. 365.
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same manner." 48  In Livingston v. Livingston, it was declared
that after adjudication, the fruits of an alimony decree constitute
rights of property which become vested by the action of the court.
They were rights which could not be destroyed by the legislature
and wore protected by the "due process" clause of the Constitu-
tion. The court said:
" 'The plaintiff, prior to the decree, had a 'right of support; by
her divorce, she lost that right and, in substitution for it, acquired
a new right, a judgment requiring the payment to her of a specific
sum of money.' That right, as a vested interest, is property which
the legislature is powerless to divest her of. If the interest is, as
it is claimed, an expectant one, in the sense that the obligation of
the defendant was a continuing one to pay alimony in the future,
nevertheless, the interest was one fixed by the judgment and was
not a mere contingency." 49
In the light of these theoretical possibilities, it may be well to
look at the few cases which have undertaken the specific problem.
A few cases have allowed attachment of alimony payments either
by garnishment or by a bill in equity.50 Still other cases, also few
in number, have denied that such payments can be reached.51 In
cheffer v. Boy,52 the court could see no reason why alimony could
not be garnished, since it must be regarded as of the nature of a
debt of record and thus clearly within the statute. Kelso v. Love-
joy 53 is another authority for the proposition that a sum of money
decreed to be paid to a divorced wife by a husband, is a fund be-
longing to the wife applicable to the payment of her debts, and
consequently may be reached in the hands of the husband before
4 8 0 'Hagan v. O'Hagan, supra n. 38 at 516 (1857).
40 Supra n. 40 at 383, 66 N. E. at 125.
C Kenge v. Delavall, 1 Vern. 326 (1685); M v. Airey, 1 Yes. Jr. 277
(1791) ; Ex parte Bremner, L. R. 1 P. & D. 254 (1866); Scheffer v. Boy, 5
Pa. Cty. Ct. 158 (1888); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 34 Hun 157 (N. Y. 1884) ;
Kelso v. Lovejoy, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. 597 (1905), aff. in Lovejoy v. Kelso, 76
Ohio St. 598, 81 N. E. 1189 (1907).
8 ickol v. Granger, 83 Ohio St. 101, 93 N. E. 527 (1910); Kingman v.
Carter, 8 Kan. App. 46, 54 Pa. 13 (1898); Andrews v. Whitney, 82 Hun 117,
31 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1894); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E.
826 (1892); Van Valkenburgh v. Bishop, '164: N. Y. Supp. 86 (App. T. 1917);
Wright v. Wright, 93 Conn. 296, 105 AtL 684 (1919); West v. Washburn,
153 App. Div. 460, 138 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1912).
52 Supra n. 50.
53 Ibid.
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being paid over by him, through attachment by garnishment. In
Stevenson v. Stevenson, a similar holding, the court explained:
"At common law (since the statute of 13 Edward I, permitting
lands to be taken on execution) all of a debtor's property, except
necessary wearing apparel, might be taken to pay the claims of
creditors. So might all rights of action arising from contract, and
also judgments recovered for the wrongs of others.
"The exceptions to this general rule exist solely by virtue of the
statutes of exemptions, and no statute has been cited exempting
alimony or the separate maintenance of a married woman." "
But the cases denying garnishment do not purport to establish
the principle that such can never be maintained. Rather, they im-
pose certain limits to the right to garnish. Some distinctions may
be deduced from the facts involved in such holdings. Thus in
Fickel v. Granger,55 it appeared that the debt for which it was
sought to appropriate the alimony had been contracted befrte, the
decree for alimony had been rendered. Examination discloses that
this was the situation in Kingman v. Carter,56 and in Andrews v.
Whitney.57  Indeed in the latter case an attempt was made to
ante-date the alimony decree in respect to the debt owed the gar-
nishor, by showing that an agreement had been made between the
husband and the wife as to the amount of alimony before the di-
vorce and before the principal debt had been contracted. Hence
the decree for alimony was but a continuance of this prior agree-
ment. The argument was so patently fictitious that it was prompt-
ly rejected, but the circumstance that the point was explained in
the opinion indicates that it was regarded as being of consequence.
In the leading case of Romaine v. Chauncey, from which the
idea is generally derived that alimony can not be garnished, it
appeared that again the sole reason for not allowing garnishment
was because the creditor's claim was one contracted prior to the
decree for divorce and alimony. It was pointed out that alimony
was intended for the wife's maintenance, as the husband owed the
duty to support her, and the amount decreed by the court for such
purpose could not be attached for the satisfaction of a preexisting
claim. The opinion continues, however:
"A debt contracted by the wife after the decree, presumably for
r Supra n. 50 at 158.
a5 83 Ohio St. 101, 93 N. B. 527 (1910).
G6 8 Ran. App. 46, 54 Pac. 13 (1898).
57 82 Hun 117, 31 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1894).
173,
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her support, and with natural reliance upon the alimony by the
creditor as the means of payment, stands upon a very different
footing from a debt of the wife contracted prior to or during the
marriage, and before its judicial dissolution.' y5
Thus, while these cases do not affirm the power to garnish where
the claim of the attaching creditor accrued after the alimony de-
cree, it is obvious that the courts rely strongly upon the fact that
the claim accrued prior thereto.
In Van Valkenburgh v. Bishop,59 where garnishment was de-
nied, thb ground, in part at least, was the fact that the alimony
was intended for the support of a minor daughter, as well as for'
the' wife. Courts might well refuse to make a subsequent alloca-
tion of the respective amounts of an alimony decree as to the sup-
port of the wife and of one or more children awarded to her
custody. In Milberger v. Veseisky, 0 the court distinguished be-
tween alimony for maintenance, and for her share of community
property, declaring that while alimony is exempt from seizure to
satisfy any of the wife's debts except those contracted after the
decree, even this exemption does not apply to a payment ordered
as the wife's share in a division of community property.
A final distinction may be gleaned from West v. Washburn, and,
it is submitted, the true rule deduced. The court denied the right
of the wife's creditor to reach alimony for the satisfaction of a
claim arising out of tort., In the course of the opinion, it was said:
"The authorities are clear that alimony as such cannot be at-
tached in an action against the wife to whom it is awarded except
in an act" for such necessaries as the husband would be obliged
to furnish had the marital relatio contmued." 61
This dictum is entirely consistent with the decision in Romaine v.
Chauncey, supra, and seems to be the only theory which is in ac-
cord with & thoroughly desirable result in all eases. Since alimony
is a sum decreed for the wife's support, there is reason for ex-
cluding creditors whose claims accrued before the divorce when
she was entitled to support from her husband irrespective of her
debts. Since her creditors could not interfere with her support
before the divorce, they may not be in a better position afterwards.
There are, it can be argued,. good grounds for excluding subse-
68 129 N. Y. 566, 569, 29 N. B. 826, 827 (1892).
69 Supra. n. 51.
80 97 zmn 433, 437, 155 Pa. 957, 958 (1916).
01158 App. Div. 460, 462, 188 N. Y. Supp. 230, 231 (1912). Italics our&
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quent creditors from attaching her support money, where the
claims7 arose from other than necessary contracts. As has been
argued in some of the cases, 6 2 public policy could not permit such
proceedings, as the same wouldobstruct the performance of a de-
cree for the enforcement of a duty in which the public is vitally
interested. It is a general rule, further, that property dedicated
by the law to a particular purpose cannot be diverted from that
purpose by garnishee proceedings.6 3 But where the attaching
creditor's claim accrued from supplying the wife with necessaries,
the public may be deemed to have an equal interest in seeing that
the fund appropriated by the law is applied to the very object for
which it was decreed in the first place, and if alimony be regarded
as a trust fund, dedicated to a purpose, it is certainly not diverted
by permitting garnishment to a creditor who has furnished the
necessaries of life. Neither the wife nor the public is injured if
the alimony installments are appropriated by attachment to sub-
serve such an end.
From a. consideration of these authorities and the principles
underlying them, it is submitted that installment payments of ali-
mony might well be held subject to garnishment upon the theory
that they are either debts or at any rate a species of property
which should be amenable to such processes. Qualifying this rule,
however, it follows from the nature and purpose of an alimony de-
cree, (1) that it should be garnished only for debts of the wife
accruing after the divorce and alimony decree, and (2) that such
attachment should be confined to the satisfaction of claims arising
out of the supply of necessaries by the creditor to the wife. When
confined within these limits, legal theory is not compromised, pub-
lic policy is not outraged, nor yet are such authorities as are avail-
able fundamentally conflicting. It remains to be seen whether any
different result should ensue if the decree awarding alimony pro-
vides that the installments be paid at regular intervals to a trustee
or third party, to be thereupon paid directly to the wife. A'provi-
sion ordering payments to be made to a bank is probably the most
common of these arrangements.
If the bank be regarded as a mere agent, appointed by the court
for the purpose of collecting the installments as they accrue, there
would seem to be little doubt that it could be garnished, as it would
62 Wright v. Wright, supra n. 51.
68 Brimblecom v. O'Brien, 69 N. H. 370, 46 At]. 187 (1898).
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have no discretion or power to apply any portion of the funds
collected, or to deduct any amount, nor change the terms of its
duties, nor exercise any judgment as to the manner of performing
its duties.64 Under an arrangement of this kind, the relation of
creditor and debtor is immediately created when money is paid to
the bank for the wife, and consequently the money can be reached
by garnishment process. 65
Nothing is changed by calling the bank, in such cases, a trustee
which has received money for the use of the wife, to be presently
paid over to her. The equitable estate of a cestui quo trust can
generally be reached by creditors.66 In England,67 as well as many
states, 68 equitable interests in land may be reached on legal exe-
cution. It has been held, further, that it is no objection to taking
the cestui's interest that it is liable to be defeated or lessened by
the happening of -a condition subsequent.6 9 An eminent court has
allowed a trustee to be garnished wher3 he held the legal title to
property but no beneficial interest, although the possession was
that of the principal debtor himself, 70 and it is a uniform rule that
the income of a trust, in the absence of restrictions as to alienation,
as well as a dry trust, can be reached by creditors. 7 '
Nor is the situation changed as to the rights and liabilities of the
parties if the bank be described by what is called in the statutes
'4Ober v. Seegmiller, 180 Iowa 462, 160 N. W. 21 (1916); Andergon v.
Taylor, 131 Iowa 485, 108 N. W. 1051 (1906) ; Lingenfelter v. Iowa Tel. Co.,
132 Iowa 211, 109 N. W. 722 (1906).
E First Nat. Bank of Davenport v. Davenport etc. R. Co., 45 Iowa 120
(1876); Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Ohippewa Valley Bank, 124 Wis. 520, 102
N. W. 1068 (1905); Bluthenthal v. Silverman, 113 Ga. 102, 38 S. E. 344
'(1901). See 8 R. C. L. S8.
See Bogert, Trusts, 442, 443 and cases cited. Riordan v. Selchlier, 146
Ala. 615, 41 So. 842 (1906); Ladd v. Judson, 174 Ill. 344, 51 N. E. 838
(1898).
411 and 2 Viet. c. 110.
4S e Humphrey v. Gerard, 83 (oun. 346, 355, 77 At. 65 (1910).
#9 First Nat. Bank of Spartanbuig v. Dougan, 250 Fed. 510 (S. D. Ga.
1918).
70 Avery v. Mpnroe 172 Mass. 132, 51 N. E. 452 (1898). See J. R. Rood,
"'A Now Phase in'Garnishment Law," 33 Am. L. Rev. 367 (1899).
71 Egbert v. DeSolms, 218 Pa. 207, 67 AtL 212 (1907); Bergman v. Lord,
194 N. Y. 70, 86 N. E. 828 (1909); Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. 332, 23 AtL. 735
(1892). See 28 0. J. 103.
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of some states an equitable custodian. 72 The question is whether
the bank has the right to possession of the sums for the purpose
of paying them over to the -wife. If so, it is liable as garnishee,
and the attaching creditor has a lien superior to the rights of the
wife.73 Consequently, there seems to be no theory as to the re-
lationship of a collecting medium or trustee upon which the right
of the wife's creditor to garnish can be denied. There remains
still to be considered the question whether the court decreeing
alimony can impose restrictions in the nature of restraints against
alienation, which will be effective to prevent the garnishment.
II
Assuming that the trial court, in decreeing alimony, provides
for the payment of installments to the wife, but that she shall
have no power to assign or alienate the same and shall have no
property interest in such installments until they are actually
paid over to her, what is the effect upon the right of her creditors
to garnish the moneys in the hands of the husband? Obviously,
if the provisions against alienation be valid, the creditor has no
power to garnish, for such is the very thing that the restraint
seeks to prevent. But such provisions in a decree of a court
conflict with the legal conception of property, and are offensive
to the theory that all property of a debtor, except that exempted
by a statute, must be answerable for his debts. The best possible
grounds for upholding such provisions, it would seem, lie in the
analogy to the spendthrift trust, for it is here only that we can find
a similar result which so qualifies the legal notion of property.
The arguments against spendthrift trusts are so well known
that it is only necessary to recall that the English courts have
uniformly held them bad,74 and this unbroken line of authority
is followed in a number of the states. 75 The majority of the
states recognize and allow spendthrift trusts. In a few others,
72 See Iowa Code 1924, §12100.
73 Hubbard v. Ellithrope, 135 Iowa 259, 112 N. W. 796 (1907); First Nat.
Bank v. Riggle, 195 Iowa 189, 190 N. W. 143 (1922) ; Byers v. Byers, 21 Iowa
268 (1866).
74 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Yes. Jr. 429 (1811); Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sine.
66 (1826).
74 Hubbard v. Hayes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 406, 98 S. W. 1034 (1907); Hobbs v.
Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419 (1864); Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900
(1903).
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as in Iowa, there are grave doubts as to their validity.78 The
reason for denying such trusts, of course, is that the anomalous
theory of property is offensive to public policy, for, as has been
aptly said, property available for the purpose of pleasure or
profit should also be amenable to the demands of justice.77 "
On the other hand, the chief contention for upholding these
trusts is that the settlor, having the power to give or withhold
arbitrarily, may give upon such terms as he chooses and may
impose such restrictions as he shall at his pleasure, see fit. Thus
it has been said in Miehols v. Eaton,
"Nor do we see any reason, in the recognized nature or tenure
of property and its transfer by will, why a testator who gives,
who gives without pecuniary return, who gets nothing of property
value from the donee, may not attach to that gift the incident of
continued use, of uninterrupted benefit of the gift, during the life
of the donee." 7 8
This, then, being one of the priheipal reasons for upholding
such trusts, it is at once apparent that" to uphold a decree for
alimony with such restraints upon the analogy to spendthrift
trusts, would be to incur all the disadvantages of the spendthrift
trust without having available any of the reasons for justifying
such restraints. It is clear that if, in the present analogy, the
70 While the dicta in the Iowa cases, since Meek v. Briggs, 37 Iowa 610, 54
X. W. 456 (1893), have assumed the validity of the spendthrift trust it has
been pointed out that no decision has squarely so held. See H. C. Hor ek,
"Spendthrift Trusts in Iowa," 4 Iowa Law Review 139. In Kiffner v.
Kiffner, 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590 (1919), it was held that a testator
had the right to create a trust fund for the benefit of his son, making the
same free from all the son's debts by conferring upon the trustee such Dower
over the fund as he the testator, might have if he were alive. - mid-trustee
had complete discretion to pay any, all or none of the inqnh or principal, if
and when he' deemed it "wis6, prudent and just" for the cestui. It is'clear
that this situation differs from the kind of trust created when the trustee is
bound to pay the income, or parts of the-principal to the cestui at regular
intervals, with no discretion on the-part of the trustee to withhold, but with a
restriction which precludes creditors/from reaching such income. If the trust
involved in Kiffner v. Kiffner, g.Wa, is a spendthrift trust, it is clear that it
is not analogous to the present situation, in any sense, and will consequently
afford no theory upon which to uphold a decree for alimony with a leliberate
restraint upon alienation.
77 See Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205, 212 (1858). See also Bogert,
Trusts, 182; H. C. Horack, op. cit. supra n. 76.
78 91 U. S. 716, 727 (1875).
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husband be regarded as the settlor, the reason for sustaining the
same is entirely absent, for he cannot give or withhold at will.
He is bound to pay the installments, and the same will be satis-
fied out of his property if he fails to do so. To regard the court
as the settlor is, of course, an equally false analogy for the obvious
reason that the court is not "giving" or transferring any prbperty
at all; it merely decrees that, the husband must pay certain sums
for the wife's support and benefit. But there is a still weightier
fallacy present here. The court is not, in any sense, in the
position of one who can give or transfer to the wife at pleasure
or arbitrarily withhold from her such alimony as she may be
entitled to receive. The discretion of the court in granting such
decrees is purely a judicial discretion, regulated by settled prac-
tices of fairness and justice, and in no sense is it a personal dis-
cretion in the nature of the discretion of one who gives to his
friends or relatives according to the caprice of his fancy. Hence,
the reason for upholding spendthrift trusts again fails.
The only other possible application of the analogy is to regard
the wife herself as the settlor of the trust. But here the entire
theory collapses, for it is universally conceded that one may not
create such a trust for his own benefit. He cannot be both the
settlor and the cestui que trust, for that constitutes a fraud upoa
his creditors. 79 In case the restraint upon alienation of the in-
stallments was made in a supplementhry decree, there is no doubt
whatever that, if the wife be regarded as the settlor, the restraint
is invalid as to creditors whose claims accrued between the date
of the original alimony decree and the supplementary decree, for
the fraud upon the creditors is obvious.8 0
The great divergence of authority as to spendthrift trusts is
itself evidence that the grounds for supporting them are extremely
questionable. If the doctrine underlying them is to be extended,
it must certainly appear that the situation to which it is extended
invokes the reasons for the doctrine, to at least an appreciable
extent. Such is not the case in our present problem. There is,
then, apparently little room for the application of the analogy of
the spendthrift trust to upholding such a decree for alimony.
79 De Rousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N. W. 896 (1917); Wenzel v.
Powder, 100 Md. 36, 59 AtL 194 (1904); Cunningham v. Bright, 228 Mass.
385, 117 N. E. 909 (1917); Ward v. Marie 73 N. J. Eq. 510, 68 AL 1084
(1907).
80 Cf. Brundage v. Cheneworth, 101 Iowa 251, 70 N. W. 211 (1897).
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If there are no specific theories, already tested and approved,
upon which to rest such restraints as we are considering, the
question must be considered, on general principles of law and
theories as to powers of courts in rendering judgments and decrees.
The most formidable difficulty involved is that a decree of this
kind runs afoul of constitutional provisions for the separation
of powers of government. Under a complete separation of powers
clause like that of the Iowa constitution,8 ' it is fundamental in
constitutional law that courts are limited, in interpreting statutes,
to lending effect only to the terms thereof, and that they may
neither enlarge in scope, add to, abridge, amend, nor otherwise
change the plain provisions thereof. It would be in excess of
jurisdiction and would be unconstitutional and void.82 Since
the "general jurisdiction" conferred upon district courts by the
constitution or statutes of most states83 obviously does not include
power to render such a decree, 84 courts must rely upon the special
statutes governing divorce and alimony for such authority.
But the ordinary statute, permitting district courts to make
such provision for the wife as is "just", or "right", etc., must
be interpreted in the light of the separation of powers clause of
the Constitution. Under this restriction courts have been held
not to have the power to amend a statute by interpolating or
8' Iowa Const., Art. III, sec. 1.
82 Denny v. Des Moines City., 143 Iowa 466, 121 N. W. 1066 (1909); Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Monona CGy., 144 Iowa 171, 122 N. W. 820 (1909) ;
Melody v. Des Moines etc. By. Co., 161 Iowa 695, 141 N. W. 438 (1913);
Wise v. Palmer, 165 Iowa 731, 147 N. W. 167 (1914).
E3 See Iowa Const., Art. V, sec. 1, 6; see Iowa Code 1924, §10761.
84"General jurisdiction" can mean but that jurisdiction which courts,
under our judicial system, inherited from England, have exercised in the past.
See McQuigan v. Delaware etc. B. Co., 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235 (1891).
For any extraordinary jurisdiction, there must be special statutory authority.
Montesano Lumber Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 Pac. 244
(1915). Now it is clear that in England prior to 1880, when divorce and ali-
mony were in the. exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts of England
(see 1 Bishop, Marriage Divorce and Separation, §153), such a decree as the
one under consideration was unheard of, as the common law courts would
certainly have ignored a decree of the ecclesiastical court exempting from the
processes of the common law a judgment for alimony. It was repeatedly
asserted that the common law subjected, in the absence of statutory exemp-
tion, a man's entire property to the payment of his debts. Hardisty and
Barney, Comb. 356 (K. B. 1697). See 3 BL Comm. (Lewis' ed.) 417-418.
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adding words to it, even if the court think that the legislature
intended to enact the act in its revised form.8 5 In Fairbanks
v. Long, it was held that a court had no power to exclude infants
from the operation of the statute of limitations. The court said:
t. ..it is sufficient to say that the statute makes no excep-
tions, and the settled rule is, in respect to the running of the stat-
ute of limitations, that the statute will run against all persons,
'and no exception to the statute can be claimed, unless it is ex-
pressly mentioned in the statute,' and 'where the statute makes no
exception the court can make none on the ground of any inherent
equity, or because it may appear to be reasonable that the statute
should not run against any party in a given case.' "86
If the consequences of a statute are evil, as where the court
thinks that sufficient authority has not been granted to make
decrees which it deems adequate to do justice in. a particular
situation, the only way to avoid the results of the defective law
is by legislative, and not by judicial, action. The courts, under
a complete separation of powers clause, do not have the power to
inaugurate social or economic reforms.87 Thus it was said, in
refusing to license a woman to practice law:
"Courts of justice were not intended to be made the instruments
of pushing forward measures of popular reform. If it be desirable
that those offices which we have borrowed from the English law,
and which, from their origin, some centuries ago, down to the
present time, have been filled exclusively by men, should also be
made accessible to women, then let the change be made, but let it
be made by that department of the government to which the con-
stitution has entrusted the power of changing the law." 8 8 .
Neither can it be maintained that courts of equity have any
more power to legislate than courts of law. This is elementary.
As was said by the supreme court in Hedges v. Dixon County:
. . . wherever the rights or the situation of parties are
clearly defined and established by law, equity has no power to
change or unsettle those rights or that situation, but in all such
instances the maxim equitas sequitur legem is strictly applicable
Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and con-
85 Holmberg v. Jones, 7 Idaho 752, 65 Pae. 563 (1901); State v. West Side
St. Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 155, 47 S. W. 959 (1898).
86 91 Mo. 628, 636, 4 S. W. 499, 501-2 (1887).
s7Burdick v. Kimball, 53 Wash. 198, 101 Pac. 845 (1909); In re Bradwell,
55 Ill. 535 (1869), aff. in 16 Wall. 130 (U. S. 1872).
88 55 IIl. 535, 540 (1869).
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stitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law.
They are bound by positive provisions of a statute equally with
courts of law . . ,89
Thus wherever the effect of the judgment of a court or the de-
cree of a court of equity would be to alter or to change the statute
involved, or to supply deficiencies in statutory enactments, or to
provide a remedy or a relief which the legislature has not pro-
vided, the judgment or decree so rendered will be an exercise of.
legislative power contrary to the Constitution.9 0  In Hansard v.
Green, there was a suit to enjoin the issuance of certain municipal
bonds. The court refused a ruling which, in view of local statutes,
would permit a municipal corporation to contract a debt upon
an agreement to issue bonds to cover it, on the ground that to
so rule would be equivalent to holding that the court had the
right and power to say that the contract should be executed, and
thus "by judicial decree to usurp a legislative function." In
Kehr v. City, it was held that courts were powerless to supply
omissions in legislation, even though the omissions made the stat-
ute unenforcible.
Upon these principles, it is submitted that if in a decree such
as we are considering by which alimony installments are placed
beyond the reach of creditors of the wife, the court has, in effect,
performed a legislative function, the same would seem to con-
stitute an excess of jurisdiction and be not binding upon such
creditors in garnishment proceedings. While it may, in particular
instances, be a desirable thing in granting decrees for alimony,
to declare the same exempt from the claims of creditors nnder
execution or garnishment, it is a proposition which the legislature
may desire to consider long and debate freely before enacting
into law. This, the courts cannot deny them the privilege of doing
by usurpation. If it can be shown, first, that the exemption of
property from the processes of the courts is a legislative function,
and, second, that such a decree as considered here constitutes an
8D 150 U. S. 182, 192, 14 Sup. Ct. 71, 74 (1893). See also Magniae v.
Thomson, 15 How. 281, 299 (U. S. 1853); see particularly Ranbo v. Bank of
Argentine, 88 Kan. 257, 128 Pac. 182 (1912).
Oo Kehr v. City of Columbia, 136 Mo. App. 322, 116 S. W. 428 (1909); State
v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730 (1913) ; Albright v. Fisher, 164 Mo.
56, 64 S. W. 106 (1901); State v. Circuit Court, 32 S. D. 573, 143 N. W. 892
(1913); Hansard v. Green, 54 Wash. 161, 103 Pac. 40 (1909).
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exemption, it follows that the same is unconstitutional, as being
a legislative function peformed by the judiciary.
At the common law, it seems that there is no exemption from
execution. All the property of a debtor, with the exception of
certain personal paraphernalia, is accessible to creditors to satisfy
their just claims. 91 Only those articles specified by statute can be
exempted, and such exempting statutes must .be construed so that
the legislature's intention will be effected, since they represent the
legislature's conception of what the policy of the state should be in
this respect. 92 The apparent exception of the immunity of gov-
ernmental agencies to garnishment proceedings when indebted to
the principal defendant, is due to the rule of public policy which
refuses to submit the governmental agency to such process, and
not because the debt or property of the principal defendant is
exempt from execution.
If the provision restricting alienation of future alimony install-
ments is contained in a supplementary decree, it is clearly invalid
as to creditors whose claims accrued before the supplementary de-
cree, but after the original award, for this violates the limitations
of the power to create exemptions which even the legislature pos-
sesses. It is indisputable that statutes which increase or create
new exemptions are invalid and inoperative as to prexisting
debts. They impair the obligation of contracts. 93  Thus it follows
that if the supplementary decree could include exempting provi-
sions as to preexisting claims, the court would be accomplishing,
by judicial decree, that which the legislature would be impotent,
under the Constitution, to effect and in respect to matters which
are specifically left, by constitutional provision, to legislatures
rather than to courts.
It must be remembered that the purpose underlying all exemp-
tions is the securing to the unfortunate debtor of the means to
support himself and his family, the protection of the family, it is
91 Seay v. Palmer, 93 A]a 381, 9 So. 601 (1891); In re Brown's Estate,
123 Calif. 399, 5 Pac. 1055 (1899); Robinson v. Burke, 70 W. H. 2, 45 AtI.
713 (1899); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 34 Hun 157 (N. Y. 1884).
92 See Hanna v. Bry, 5 La. Ann. 651 (1850); see also Kneetle v. Newcomb,
22 N. Y. 249 (1860).
93 Willard v. Sturm, 96 Iowa 555, 65 N. W. 847 (1896) ; Edwards v. Kear-
zey, 96 U. S. 595 (1877).
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urged, being the main consideration.9 4 In view of this purpose, it
is significant that the creditor whose claims arose before a supple-
mentary decree restraining alienation must be deemed to have re-
lied upon the future installments, and yet it is said that exempt
property is something upon which creditors cannot be regarded as
having relied when credit was extended. It is obvious that to
defeat such a creditor by denying him the right to" garnish is
counter to all theory underlying exemptions, and, in addition, is
accomplishing an end which has been uniformly held to be beyond
legislative power.
In Re Brown's Estate an attempt was made to increase the ex-
emption allowed by statute by an appeal to the court. In sustain-
ing a ruling of the court below refusing to, act in the premises, it
was said:
"Exemptions are the creatures of statutes and exceptions to the
general rule. No property is exempt unless made so by express
provision of law. No assumed legislative policy can justify the
courts in adding to the statutory list of exemptions. Legislators
are presumed to understand the force and effect of the language
which is used and to have contemplated all circumstances which
would make it desirable that other property not in the lists of
exemptions should be added thereto." 9 5
It only remains to investigate the question whether or not an
alimony decree restraining alienation of future installments can be
fairly construed to constitute an addition to the exemptions al-
lowed by statute. Exemption has been defined as the "right given
by law to a debtor to retain a portion of his property without its
being liable to execution at the suit of a creditor or a distress for
rent,"9 6 and an essential feature of exemption is that it shall be
permanently exempt in the debtor's hands from seizure by his
creditors under judicial process.9 7 The very object of exemptions,
as pointed out above, is to preserve for the debtor what, in the
absence thereof at the common law, would be reached by the proc-
esses of the courts. This, then, is precisely and in terms what an
alimony decree restraining alienation of future installments brings
04 See Schooley v. Schooley, 184 Iowa 835, 169 N. W. 56 (1917) ; Griffin v.
Sutherland, 14 Barb. 456 (N. Y. 1852), particularly at p. 459; Grant v.
Phoenix-Jellico Coal Co., 155 Ky. 585, 159 S. W. 1161 (1913).
0 123 Calif. 399, 401, 55 Pa. 1055 (1899).
go 1 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d Rev.) 1152.
07 In re Burnett, 201 Fed. 162 (E. D. Tenn. 1912).
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about, for it has been determined above that in the absence of such
a decree, the installments could be reached by garnishment. This
thing which the alienation provisions in a decree attempt to accom-
plish is literally identical with the definition of an exemption,
namely, to create "a right . . . to a debtor to retain a portion
of his property without its being liable to execution at the suit of
a creditor, or a distress for rent." To argue that such a decree
does not create an exemption, because it is not such a right given
by statute, is, of course, to beg the, question because it assumes the
very point in issue. The validity of such a contention rests upon a
conclusion of law which was the precise thing that the separation
of powers clause of the Constitution sought to prohibit. The court
by such a decree produces the identical effect, so far as the gar-
nishing creditor is concerned, as a statutory exemption. If this is
.not performing a function which has immemoriably pertained to
the legislative department of government, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to conceive how courts could ever perform such a func-
tion.
In effect, to hold that the furnishing of provisions restricting
alienation in an alimony decree is not a legislative function, is
equivalent to maintaining that nothing can be a legislative func-
tion when performed by any other agency than the legislature.
The nature of such a contention, of course, is apparent from the
fact that, if such an argument be sound, the separation of powers
clause is nullified, with the result that courts have unlimited
power to avoid, amend or abrogate all legislative enactments at
their pleasure.
It must be plain, further, that if courts in decreeing alimony
have power to make it exempt from court processes, there is no
conceivable reason to prevent them from making similar arbitrary
provisions with respect to every decree in which property inter-
ests of the litigants are adjudicated. This follows from a consid-
eration of the theory that alimony is as much a property interest
as any other property right.98 . Thus not only might the separation
of powers clause be violated, but every constitutional safeguard in
the nature of limitations upon legislative action could be as well
transcended, and courts exercise more and broader legislative
power than legislatures themselves.
But one point remains to be mentioned. Is a decree for alimony
98 Audubon v. Shufeldt, supra n. 44; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 59, Minn. 347,
61 N. W. 334 (1894).
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with provisions as to future alienation such as we have been con-
sidering open to collateral attack?' In other words, could a subse-
quent garnishing creditor plead and show the want of power of
the court which decreed the alimony to incorporate such provi-
sions therein? Since the real question involved is one of jurisdic-
tion, it seems clear that the decree could be attacked collaterally.
It is elementary, of course, that if a court, in rendering judgment,
lacks either jurisdiction of subject matter or jurisdiction of
parties, the judgment is void and can be collaterally attacked. 99 it
is sometimes said, however, that if the .court has jurisdiction of
both parties and subject matter, its judgment cannot be attacked
in a collateral proceeding.10 0 But this statement must be quali-
fied with the provision, that the judgment is equally invalid, if the
court, having power to act in the premises, exceeds the powers
which it has derived from the authority which created'it, and pro-
nounces a judgment which it had no authority to make.10 '
"The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction
it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause,
and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collat-
erally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according
to the established modes governing the class to which the case be-
longs and doep not transcend in the extent and character of its
judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it."''0
In summarizing, it appears, first, that the proposition that ali-
mony cannot be garnished, is questionable on principle. Alimony,
payable in future installments, would seem to be subject to gar-
nishment under the ordinary garnishment statutes, and under a
statute which subjects "debts not yet due" to such processes.
Second, while the foregoing is, in general, the governing principle,
it must be qualified by certain exceptions, which, when examined
restrict the garnishment of alimony to situations where the ered-
itor's claims were contracted after the decree for alimony, where
the claim was contracted for necessaries furnished the wife after
go 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) 668.
100 Cf. ibid. pp. 641-642.
101 See Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879), partieularly at p. 23; Baldwin
v. Foster, 157 Calif. 643, 108 Pac 714 (1910); Ritehie v. Sayers, 100 Fed.
520 (1900); Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 IL 140, 133 N. E. 58 (1921).
102 Armstrong v. Obucino, supra n. 101 at 143, 133 N. E. at 59. See also
1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) 733.
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the decree for alimony, and where there are no dependent minors
relying upon the future installments for support.
On principle and by analogy, it seems that specific provisions
contained in the alimony decree that the same shall not be alien-
ated or assigned by the wife prior to their actually being paid over
to her, are of no force to change the above conclusions. Such pro-
visions amount to legislation in that they extend the exemptions of
debtors under execution, and are thus unconstitutional as being in
excess of jurisdiction. The theory of -the spendthrift trust is not
available, it seems, to support such provisions for the reason that
the grounds upon which such trusts are upheld are entirely want-
ing. The provisions, thus being beyond the power and authority
of a court to make, the same may be attacked collaterally in gar-
nishment proceedings and should be a sufficient reason for the
court's overruling a motion to discharge the -arnishee on the
grounds that the money he is bound to pay is protected by the
provisions against alienation in the alimony decree.
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